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INDEPENDENT SPENDING, POLITICAL ACTION
COMMITTEES, AND THE NEED FOR FURTHER
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
The role of political action committee (PAC) contributions within the
electoral process has been criticized by commentators' and legislators2 alike.
Yet, a potentially larger danger goes relatively unnoticed. The tremendous
growth in total PAC contributions over the past two decades3 has occurred
within the confines of federal ceilings on contribution amounts.4 In contrast,
a less familiar PAC campaign technique, the independent expenditure, is not
subject to federal ceilings. PAC "independent expenditures" are those made
on a candidate's behalf, but without the beneficiary's consultation or ap-
proval. 5 In the 1984 presidential election, over $16 million in independent
expenditures aided President Reagan's re-election campaign.6 Because it buys
additional media advertising, an independent spending campaign conducted
by a sophisticated PAC is just as beneficial to a candidate as a comparable
direct contribution. As Supreme Court Justice White stated, "Independent
PAC expenditures function as contributions." 7
1. See E. DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY 4, 38-52, 84-93 (1982); A. ETZIONI, CAPITAL
CORRUPTION 182-208 (1984); Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amend-
ment an Obstacle to Political Equality? 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 614-20 (1982). But see Budde,
The Practical Role of Corporate PACs in the Political Process, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 555 (1980)
(PACs are an outgrowth of corporate involvement in politics); Elliot, Political Action Com-
mittees-Precincts of the '80s, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 539 (1980) (PACs are a healthy addition to
political process).
2. See Chiles, PACs: Congress on the Auction Block, 11 J. LEGIS. 193 (1984). Congressional
concern for the role of PAC money in the political process reached a high in 1983, when 17
bills introduced that year focussed wholly or in part on restricting PACs. J. CANTOR, POLITICAL
ACTION COMMITTEES: THEIR EVOLUTION, GROWTH AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
(Cong. Res. Service Rep. No. 84-78 197 (1984)). Senator Robert Dole of Kansas commented,
"When these political action committees give money, they expect something in return other
than good government." Taylor, Efforts to Revise Campaign Laws Aim at PACs, Washington
Post, Feb. 28, 1983, at Al, col. 1. See also infra text accompanying note 15.
3. See infra text accompanying note 144.
4. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1982 and Supp. IV 1986).
5. "The term 'independent expenditure' means an expenditure by a person expressly
advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate which is made without
cooperation of consultation with any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such
candidate, and which is not made in concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, any
candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate." 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1982
and Supp. IV 1986). See also 11 C.F.R. § 109 (1987) (further definition of statutory term).
6. See FEC INDEX OF INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES, 1983-84.
7. FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 510 (1985) (White,
J., dissenting).
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A majority of the Supreme Court, however, disagrees with this view. In
Buckley v. Valeo,8 the seminal decision on federal campaign finance legis-
lation, the Court compared restrictions imposed on the amounts of direct
contributions with those imposed on independent expenditures. The Court
found both a practical and a constitutional distinction between the two
campaign techniques. 9 Thus, the Court upheld limits on amounts directly
contributed to campaigns while striking similar ceilings on independent
spending which benefit candidate campaigns.' 0 More recently, the Court
forcefully announced the special protection given to independent PAC spend-
ing in FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee." There, a
ceiling on independent expenditures in publicly-funded presidential campaigns
was held unconstitutional.' 2 Two related consequences of these Supreme
Court decisions have been the dissection of a comprehensive campaign
finance legislative scheme and the phenomenon of increased independent
PAC spending.
I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment will explore the political ramifications of the distinction
first articulated in Buckley v. Valeo, a distinction which has directly and
indirectly enlarged the role PACs play in campaigns through independent
expenditures. The inquiry will begin with a brief review of the present
regulatory scheme for PACs and independent spending. An examination of
Buckley v. Valeo and subsequent decisions concerning the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA) 3 will further detail the unique constitutional protec-
tion given to unlimited independent PAC spending. After a brief look at
the power of PAC money, this Comment will discuss four reasons why
restrictions on independent spending are necessary and constitutional. Fi-
nally, this Comment will examine an array of suggested reforms. Because
each reform option suffers from some inherent shortcoming, a new statutory
ceiling on independent PAC spending is proposed. The arguments which are
made here, and a ceiling on expenditures much higher than those previously
held unconstitutional, support a limit on this campaign technique.
In 1976 the Supreme Court first frustrated Congress's attempt to curb the
huge expenditures of money made by and on behalf of political campaigns.
Later decisions have maintained the position, first assumed by the Court in
Buckley, that independent spending on a candidate's behalf does not pose
the inherent danger posed by large contributions to a candidate's campaign.'
4
8. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
9. Id. at 19-23. See infra text accompanying notes 77-83.
10. 424 U.S. at 23-51. See also infra text accompanying notes 70-93.
I1. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
12. Id. at 496-501. See also infra text accompanying notes 115-29.
13. Current version codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 98-129.
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Regardless of the initial wisdom of this view, four aspects of the current
electoral process create the need for a re-evaluation. First, the view that
independent PAC spending poses no corruptive potential is outdated. Second,
because independent spending can aid a candidate just as direct contributions
do, independent expenditures constitute a loophole in contribution restric-
tions. Third, PAC spending engenders an appearance of corruption which
taints the political process as much as actual corruption. Finally, the evi-
dentiary and political burdens on the Federal Election Commission (FEC)
make difficult the investigation of improper coordination between candidates
and PACs who spend on their behalf. Senator Dan Evans' statement that
independent expenditures are "probably the highest sleaze factor in cam-
paigns today"" may have been an example of congressional rhetoric. Behind
that rhetoric, however, is the reality that independent spending creates the
potential for corruption and it is now time for Congress to impose stronger
restrictions on independent spending.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Present Regulatory Scheme of PACs and Independent Spending
1. Categories
The number of PACs and the amount of their independent spending 6 has
grown substantially while subject to a federal regulatory scheme. Although
independent expenditures may also be made by individuals, the cost and
effort necessary for effective independent campaigns makes them uniquely
PAC phenomena.17
Regulation begins with categorization. The catch-all phrase "political ac-
tion committee" refers to three types of statutorily-defined groups. Virtually
all PACs are "political committees," as defined by the FECA. s One type
15. Novak & Cobb, The Kindness of Strangers, COMMON CAUSE, Sept./Oct. 1987, at 32.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 143-58.
17. In 1984, nine of the top ten independent spenders were PACs. See FEC Press Release,
October 4, 1985, at 2.
18. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (1982).
The term "political committee" means-(A) any committee, club, association, or
other group of persons which receives contributions aggregating in excess of $1,000
during a calendar year or which makes expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000
during a calendar year; or
(B) any separate segregated fund established under the provisions of § 441b(b) of
this title; or
(C) any local committee of a political party which receives contributions aggregating
in excess of $5,000 during a calendar year, or makes payments exempted from the
definition of contribution or expenditure as defined in paragraphs (8) and (9)
aggregating in excess of $5,000 during a calendar year, or makes contributions
aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or makes expenditures
aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year.
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of PAC is any club, association or group which receives political contribu-
tions or makes political expenditures exceeding $1,000 a year. 19 Most political
committees are also "multi-candidate committees," which means they are at
least six months old, have more than 50 contributors and have given money
to at least five federal candidates. 20 The multi-candidate committee desig-
nation allows the PAC to contribute larger sums of money than individuals
or other political committees. 21 A third category of PACs is distinguished
by its affiliation with a sponsoring organization. A "separate segregated
fund" PAC allows corporations and unions-two organizations prohibited
from making direct contributions or expenditures-to participate politically
as PACs. 22 Although much attention is focused on the unaffiliated PACs,
23
separate segregated fund PACs account for nearly 80 percent of all PACs.
24
The three types of PACs however, are not mutually exclusive categories;
most PACs fall into all three. The FEC presently divides PACs into six
categories for statistical purposes. 2
2. Registration and reporting requirements
Notwithstanding the speciar restrictions on segregated funds, all PACs are
similarly regulated. PACs must first register with the FEC. 26 In addition, all
PACs are required to provide basic information on the identity of the
committee; its affiliated organization or candidate, if any; the name and
address of the treasurer; and the banks used by the committee. 27 PAC officials
may or may not decide to incorporate. While by-laws which establish goals,
guidelines and organizational structure are recommended by some authorities,
19. Id. § 431(4)(a).
20. 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(e)(3) (1987).
21. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 441a(1) (1982) (contribution limit of $1,000 per election) with id.
§ 441a(2) ($5,000 per election).
22. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982). Corporations have been prohibited from making contributions
in federal elections since 1907. See Tillman Act, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907). The
ban was later extended to unions. See War Labor Disputes Act, Pub. L. No. 78-89, § 9, 57
Stat. 163, 167-68 (1943). For a brief discussion of the history and purpose of § 441b, see J.
CANTOR, supra note 2, at 3-5, 36-38; Note, Integrating the Right of Association with the Bellotti
Right to Hear-Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 72 CORNELL
L. REv. 159, 168-70 (1986).
23. E.g., Latus, Assessing Ideological PACs: From Outrage to Understanding in MONEY
AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 142 (M. Malbin ed. 1984).
24. J. CANTOR, supra note 2, at 3.
25. The FEC categorizes PACs based on the characteristics of the committees' sponsors. In
1987-88, there were 1937 corporate, 394 labor, 820 trade/member/health, 61 cooperative, 166
corporations without stock, and 1200 "nonconnected" PACs. FEC Press Release, September
8, 1988. See generally Eismeier & Pollock, Political Action Committees: Varieties of Organi-
zation and Strategy in MONEY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 122 (M. Malbin ed. 1984)
(discussion of similarities and differences among PAC types).
26. 2 U.S.C. § 433(a) (1982).
27. 11 C.F.R. § 102.2 (1987).
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they are not required by law. 28 If a PAC is organized primarily to receive
and spend political monies, it qualifies for limited tax-exempt status. 29 PACs
must also file reports on their financial activities at regular intervals. Total
receipts; receipts from individuals, party committees and other political
committees; loans; dividends and interest earned must all be reported sepa-
rately.3 0 PACs contributing more than $200 a year must be identified by
name and give the date and amount of their contribution.3 Total expenditures
must be reported by category and those receiving funds must be identified
by name and address. 2 Finally, PACs must disclose the amount of cash on
hand as well as their outstanding debts and obligations. 3
3. Contribution restrictions and expenditure regulations
Political committees, like individuals, are limited to contributing $1,000
to any candidate for each election.3 4 Thus, the ceiling is $2,000 for a candidate
who wins the primary and campaigns in the general election. A multican-
didate committee, however, may contribute up to $5,000 per candidate per
election.35 Thus, a nationally-based PAC with more than 50 contributors is
permitted to contribute $8,000 more than an individual to a particular
candidate. The contribution limits for corporate and labor PACs depend on
whether or not they are designed as multi-candidate committees. The Pres-
idential Election Campaign Fund Act (Fund Act)3 6 imposes additional con-
tribution restrictions. Public funding of presidential candidates is conditioned
upon the candidate's refusal of private contributions during the general
campaign. 7 Thus, PACs may not contribute to the general campaign of a
presidential nominee who receives public funding.
The low ceilings on direct contributions from PACs (or complete prohi-
bitions in some presidential races) starkly contrast the absence of similar
limits on independent PAC expenditures. The lack of limits on independent
PAC expenditures can not be attributed to lack of effort on Congress's part.
28. See CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE GUIDELINES, 1-9 (Chamber of Commerce
of the United States of America, 1982).
29. I.R.C. § 527 (1987).
30. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(2) (1982 and Supp. IV 1986).
31. Id. § 434(b)(3).
32. Id. § 434(b)(4) (operating expenses, transfers to other committees, loans, and independent
expenditures are a few categories); id. § 434(b)(5).
33. Id. §§ 434(b)(1), 434(b)(8).
34. Id. § 441a(a)(1)(A).
35. Id. § 441a(a)(2)(A).
36. I.R.C. §§ 9001-13 (1987). The fund is maintained through a voluntary check-off on
federal tax forms. Id. § 006(a). It distributes to each major party presidential candidate who
agrees to comply with spending and contribution limits an amount equal to $20,000,000 in 1972
dollars, adjusted for inflation. Id. § 9004(a)(1). In 1980, the two party nominees received $29.4
million in public subsidies. Alexander, The Regulation and Funding of Presidential Elections,
1 J. L. & POL. 43, 54 (1983).
37. I.R.C. § 9003(b)(2) (1987).
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The 1971 FECA provided that all expenditures on a candidate's behalf, even
if made by a third party, were treated as expenditures by the candidate.38
This presumption could be rebutted only by showing that no candidate
directly or indirectly authorized the activity. a9 Such candidate certification
was subsequently held to be an unconstitutional prior restraint in violation
of the first amendment. 0 In response, Congress amended the FECA in 1974
and limited expenditures made independent of a candidate's campaign to
$1,000. 4 1 The Supreme Court struck down this provision as violative of first
amendment rights of political expression and association.4 2 In a later decision,
the Court invalidated the $1,000 ceiling on independent spending on behalf
of a publicly-funded presidential candidate. 43 The Court there noted that
"PACs' expenditures are entitled to full First Amendment protection." 44
Subsequent congressional regulation of independent expenditures has been
limited to requiring full disclosure of such campaign activities. Any inde-
pendent expenditure exceeding $200 necessitates reporting the name and
address of the payee, along with the date, amount and purpose of the
expenditure. 45 The spending PAC must also indicate whether the independent
expenditure is in support of or in opposition to a candidate, as well as the
name and office sought by such candidate. 46 Finally, the PAC or individual
must certify that the expenditure was not made in cooperation or consultation
with the candidate.4 7 Any independent expenditure aggregating $1000 or
more and made within the final 20 days of the election must be reported
within 24 hours. 41
4. Segregated fund PACs
Regulation which is unique to segregated fund PACs is generally designed
to monitor the influence of the sponsoring organization. Use of any money
contributed under threat or without knowledge of its political purpose is
expressly prohibited.4 9 Segregated fund PACs are further limited in their
ability to solicit contributions. For corporate and labor PACs, the FECA
38. Because the legislative history of the 1971 FECA supported such an interpretation,
regulations to that effect were promulgated. J. CANTOR, THE EVOLUTION OF AND ISSUES
SURROUNDING INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS (Cong. Res. Service Rep.
No. 82-87) 7-8 (1982).
39. Id. at 8.
40. ACLU v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.C.Cir. 1973), vacated sub nom. ACLU v.
Staats, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 608 (Supp. IV 1975).
42. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976).
43. FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
44. Id. at 496.
45. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3) (1982).
46. Id. § 434(c).
47. Id. § 434(b)(6)(B)(iii).
48. Id. § 434(c)(2)(C).
49. Id. § 441b(b)(3).
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limits the number of solicitations of those not connected to the sponsoring
organization to two times a year.5 0 The solicitation practices of nonconnected
PACs (those without a sponsoring organization) are not similarly regulated.
A corporation or union may not contribute directly to its segregated fund,
but may pay all start-up, administrative, and solicitation costs of the separate
PAC." Moreover, the segregated fund may be completely controlled by the
sponsoring corporation or union, whose officers may decide how the PAC's
money is spent.5 2 Segregated fund PACs are subject to the federal law
restricting individual contributions to all PACs to $5,000 in any calendar
year.53
5. The role of the Federal Election Commission
The FEC is responsible for policing the independence of independent
spending. A large part of this task involves the issuance of advisory opinions5 4
which may, among other things, explain what constitutes the "cooperation"
or "consultation" which destroys the "independent" nature of PAC spend-
ing.5 The FEC is also responsible for investigating improper coordination
between candidates and the PACs who spend on their behalf.5 6 However,
because many believe that instances of collusion between candidates and
PACs far outnumber those that the FEC has officially discovered, the FEC
has been criticized for its weak enforcement record. 7
50. Id. § 441b(b)(4). Generally, corporations and their PACs may solicit only shareholders,
executives, and their families. Labor PACs may solicit only their members and their families.
Id. § 441b(b)(4)(A)(ii). Solicitation restrictions on a nonprofit corporation were upheld in FEC
v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
51. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1982).
52. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 200 n.4 (1982).
53. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (1982).
54. 2 U.S.C. § 437(0 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) details the Commission's power to issue
advisory opinions. See also 11 C.F.R. § 112 (1987) (procedures for requesting and issuing
advisory opinions); Baran, The Federal Election Commission: A Guide for Corporate Counsel,
22 ARiz. L. REv. 519, 536-37 (1980) (administrative procedure for issuing advisory opinions).
55. 11 C.F.R. § 109.1(b)(4) (1987) provides general guidelines as to what is "cooperation"
or "consultation." An expenditure resulting from cooperation with the candidate is considered
an in-kind contribution to the candidate and an expenditure by the candidate. Id. § 109.1(c).
Thus, PACs wanting to avoid contribution and expenditure restrictions want their spending
classified as "independent."
56. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See also 11 C.F.R. § 111 (1987)
(compliance procedure). Two other areas of investigation are whether the expenditure is (i)
express advocacy of the election or defeat of (2) a clearly identified candidate. Comment, The
Federal Election Campaign Act and Presidential Election Fund Act: Problems in Defining and
Regulating Independent Expenditures, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 977, 989 [hereinafter Comment,
Regulating Independent Expenditures]. See infra text accompanying notes 219-28.
57. See, e.g., Novak & Cobb, supra note 15, at 35; O'Connor, Who's Afraid of the F.E.C.?,
18 WASH. MONTHLY 22 (March 1986); Comment, Campaign Finance Re-Reform: The Regulation
of Independent Political Committees, 71 CALiF. L. REV. 673, 688-91 (1983) [hereinafter Com-
ment, Campaign Finance Re-Reform]. See infra text accompanying notes 229-35.
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B. The Supreme Court's Role in Campaign Finance Regulation
The era of modern federal campaign finance regulation" began with the
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971.59 Congress's first attempt
to fully exercise its constitutional power to regulate federal elections6° limited
the total amount federal candidates could spend on media advertising,
restricted the amount federal candidates could contribute to their own cam-
paigns, and required more complete disclosure of contributions and expen-
ditures. 61 The FECA has been credited with revealing the abuses of the
Watergate scandal. 62 In turn, the Watergate scandal spurred the creation of
further campaign finance reform.
The FECA Amendments of 197463 have been described as "the most
comprehensive reform legislation passed by Congress." 64 Briefly stated, the
1974 amendments limited the amount of contributions to candidates for
federal office,65 limited the amount of independent expenditures per candi-
date,6 specified detailed reporting and record-keeping requirements for can-
didates and political committees,6 7 and established the Federal Election
Commission. 6 Within days of the amendments' effective date, the consti-
tutionality of the FECA was challenged. 6 9
1. Buckley v. Valeo
In Buckley v. Valeo70 the Supreme Court upheld some provisions of the
1974 amendments to the FECA while striking down others, The decision has
58. Until 1971, most federal law relating to campaign finance was codified in the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925).
59. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
60. "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time
by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
61. At about the same time, the Revenue Act of 1971 provided for a voluntary system of
publicly-financed presidential candidacies. Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 801, 85 Stat. 497, 562 (1971).
The current public-funding legislation is codified at I.R.C. §§ 9001-13 (1987).
62. See, e.g., Nicholson, The Supreme Court's Meandering Path in Campaign Finance
Regulation and What it Portends for Future Reform, 3 J.L. & POL. 509, 511 (1987).
63. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
64. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831 (D.C.Cir. 1975).
65. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1982).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (1970 ed. Supp. IV) (repealed 1976).
67. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-34 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
68. Id. §§ 437(c), (d), (f) & (g). The 1974 legislation also provided for public matching
funds for presidential candidates during the prenomination campaign and limits on overall
campaign expenditures during that period. I.R.C. §§ 9031-42 (1982).
69. Among the ideologically diverse plaintiffs who were challenging the legislation were
Senator James Buckley, former Senator Eugene McCarthy, the Mississippi Republican Party
and the New York Civil Liberty Union. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1976). The per
curiam decision, appendix, and separate opinions filled 294 pages of the United States Reports.
70. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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had as much impact on campaign finance reform in this country as the 1974
legislation itself. The Court examined the governmental interests served by
the FECA and the first amendment rights implicated by the legislation, and
then balanced the two. The immediate result of the decision was judicial
dissection of the legislative scheme, which prompted the 1976 amendments
to the FECA. 71 The most consequential long-term effect of Buckley is the
Court's constitutional distinction between contribution restrictions and limits
on expenditures.
The Court first established a framework of first amendment analysis in
which it examined the FECA's limits on campaign funding and spending.
Two constitutional guarantees were implicated by the campaign finance
reform legislation. The Court reasoned that since the public debate of issues
and candidates is essential to democracy, the right to political expression
was a paramount consideration in the evaluation of the legislation.72 Rec-
ognizing the need and efficacy of group association in political advocacy,
the Court also noted that the first amendment protects political association. 73
The Buckley majority explicitly rejected the argument that the contribution
and expenditure provisions regulated conduct, rather than speech. The Court
noted that contribution and expenditure limitations "impose direct quantity
restrictions on political communication and association." ' 74 By recognizing
the dependence of both candidates and the electorate on the media and its
expensive modes of communication, 75 the Court accepted the maxim "money
talks.' '76
According to the Court's reasoning, however, money talks in different
ways. The Court found constitutional and practical distinctions between
direct contributions and independent expenditures which supported its de-
cision to uphold limits on the former while striking down similar limits on
the latter. One such distinction was the different roles the two campaign
finance techniques play. The Buckley majority characterized an individual's
contribution to a candidate as a symbol of support. A ceiling on contribution
size, therefore, is not a restraint of political expression since the symbolic
71. Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976).
72. 424 U.S. at 14-23. See also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("[a] major
purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs").
73. 424 U.S. at 15-16. See also Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973) (first
amendment "freedom to associate" encompasses right to associate with a political party);
Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 22 (1964)
("Associational expression is simply an extension of individual right of expression, and for the
same reasons and to the same extent, should be free of governmental abridgement."). The
Buckley court, however, recognized that the right to associate is not absolute. 424 U.S. at 25.
74. 424 U.S. at 18.
75. Id. at 19.
76. Id. at 262 (White, J., dissenting); FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. at 509 (White, J., dissenting). See generally Wright, supra note 1 (Supreme Court
decisions used first amendment as justification for nondemocratic effects of concentrated wealth
in election campaigns). See also infra note 78.
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expression of support remains unaffected. 77 The message "I support you"
is communicated even if the contribution is limited to $1000.
However, the Court viewed the amount of independent expenditures as
directly related to the quality and quantity of political speech. In contrast
to the symbolic nature of a contribution is the vital practicality of an
expenditure. "Virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass
society requires the expenditure of money." '78 Thus, statutory limits on
independent spending constitute "substantial rather than merely theoretical
restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech." '79
The Court also found the FECA's $1,000 limit more burdensome on the
first amendment freedom of association in the context of the independent
expenditure than in the context of direct contributions.80 Contribution ceilings
restrict one means of associating with a candidate, but allow the contributor
to join a political committee and to provide personal assistance to the
committee's efforts on behalf of the candidate.8 ' Independent spending limits,
77. 424 U.S. at 21. "A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate
or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication,
for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in
any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues." Id. The Court
also noted that contributions become political expression only through a candidate or political
association. Id. But see id. at 244 (Burger, CA., separate opinion) ("We do little but engage
in word games unless we recognize that people-candidates and contributors-spend money on
political activity because they wish to communicate ideas, and their constitutional interest in
doing so is precisely the same whether they or someone else utters the words."). See also
Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 22-
23 (contributors have secondary speech interest in speaking through a candidate).
78. 424 U.S. at 19 (emphasis added). Buckley can be viewed as protecting the right of the
wealthy to influence the political process. The Court explicitly rejected the governmental interest
in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to affect election outcomes as a
justification for limits on independent spending. "[Tihe concept that government may restrict
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment." Id. at 48-49. Some commentators have forcefully
criticized this aspect of the Buckley decision. See Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitu-
tionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Wis. L. REV. 323, 327-
40 (1977); Shockey, Money in Politics: Judicial Roadblocks to Campaign Finance Reform, 10
HASTINGS CoNsr L.Q. 679, 693-99 (1983); Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363,
1387 (1984). See also Forrestor, The New Constitutional Right to Buy Elections, 69 A.B.A. J.
1078, 1080 (1983) ("[T]his sweeping pronouncement [in Buckley] is about as sound as a
declaration that the First Amendment protects the use of bullhorns by those able to afford
them to drown out other speakers in political debate."). But see FEC v. National Conservative
Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985) (analogizing $1,000 limit on independent
spending in presidential races to "allowing a speaker in a public hall to express his views while
denying him the use of an amplifying system").
79. 424 U.S. at 19. But see The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 171, 179
(1976) ("In fact, the pooling of funds contributed by supporters and delegation of promotional
decisions to the candidate will produce more cost-effective and articulate advocacy than could
be achieved by individual expenditures.").
80. 424 U.S. at 22.
81. Id. Such reasoning has prompted some commentators to call Buckley a compromise
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however, restrict the ability of PACs to reflect and amplify the voice of
their contributors.8 2 Thus, before examining the specific provisions of the
FECA, the Court established as a general principle that expenditure limits
infringe upon first amendment freedoms more than contribution limits.8 3
Because the Court considered the spending limits more constitutionally
problematic than contribution limits, it apparently applied different levels
of scrutiny to the two types of legislation.14 In the context of contributions
regulation, the Court held that specific amount restrictions were valid. The
Court explicitly rejected the contention that narrowly drawn disclosure re-
quirements and bribery laws, although constituting a less restrictive means
of regulation than contribution limits, were the constitutionally mandated
alternative s.8  Instead, the Buckley Court was quick to defer to Congress's
determination that such limits were necessary to prevent actual and apparent
corruption resulting from large contributions.8 6 The Court applied more
exacting scrutiny, however, to the limitations on independent expenditures.8 7
Despite the congressional view that unlimited independent spending threatens
the integrity of contribution limits, as the Court found that no such danger
decision. E.g., Fleischman & McCorkle, Level-Up Rather Than Level-Down: Towards a New
Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 1 J.L. & PoL. 211, 222-23 (1984). See also Nicholson,
supra note 62, at 545 (Burger Court's divergent approaches to campaign finance legislation
may be explained by desire to construct policy compromises).
82. 424 U.S. at 22. The first amendment rights of PACs were further explored in FEC v.
National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 493-95 (1985).
83. 424 U.S. at 23.
84. The Court did not expressly announce a lower standard of judicial scrutiny for contri-
bution limits, but later lower court and Supreme Court decisions recognized differing levels of
scrutiny. E.g., FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 616, 629 (1986) ("We
have consistently held that restrictions on contributions require less compelling justification
than restrictions on independent spending."). Accord Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp.
489, 496 (1980) ("A 'contribution' case ...is entitled less-exacting judicial scrutiny.
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 129 (1982).
85. 424 U.S. at 27.
86. Id. at 26-28. A unanimous Court later continued to apply minimal scrutiny and pay
great deference to congressional attempts to regulate contributions in FEC v. National Right
to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982). At issue there was the power of statutorily segregated
funds to solicit contributions. National Right to Work Committee (NRWC) was a nonprofit
corporation organized to oppose the role of labor unions in the United States. Id. at 200. After
the ideological corporation solicited contributions from 267,000 individuals, the FEC found
probable cause that NRWC violated the federal law limiting solicitation by segregated fund
PACs to "members." Id. at 201. Citing the 75-year history of the federal ban on corporate
contributions, the Court declined to "second-guess a legislative determination as to the need
for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil feared." Id. at 210. Such judicial
deference, however, was inappropriate when reviewing restrictions on independent spending.
See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 616, 629 (1986) ("[Tlhe desirability
of a broad prophylactic rule cannot justify treating alike business corporations and appellee
[an ideological corporation] in the regulation of independent spending.").
87. 424 U.S. at 44-45. See infra text accompanying notes 162-66.
88. See S. REP. No. 689, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974). "[C]ontrols [on independent
expenditures] are imperative if Congress is to enact meaningful limits on direct contributions.
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existed.8 9
The Court's view that independent spending, unlike contributions, posed
no danger of corruption was the final rationale offered for striking down
the $1,000 limit on independent expenditures. The per curiam decision
adopted the conclusion of Congress and the Court of Appeals that "large
contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and
potential office holders."' 9 The interest in limiting actual and apparent
corruption was thus sufficient to uphold the FECA's contribution limits. 91
That same interest, however, was found inadequate to justify the ceiling on
independent expenditures. 92 Because expenditures were not coordinated or
approved by the candidate, the Court found diminished potential for cor-
ruption. Indeed, the Court reasoned, such independent spending may prove
counterproductive to a candidate's campaign. 93 Under the Buckley analysis,
a $10,000 contribution to a candidate poses the danger of corruption while
a $10,000 expenditure made independent of the candidate, but on his behalf,
is potentially counterproductive and most likely innocuous.
Justice White, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, questioned the
distinctions drawn by the majority. He would have deferred to the congres-
sional determination that independent spending limits were necessary to
prevent evasion of the contribution limits. 94 Justice White believed that
concern for actual corruption and the appearance of corruption justified
spending restrictions just as it justified contribution restrictions. 9 Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun agreed that there were no constitutional
differences between contribution limits and expenditure limits. "For me
contributions and expenditures are two sides of the same first amendment
Otherwise, wealthy individuals limited to a [$1,000] direct contribution could also purchase one
hundred thousand dollars' worth of advertisements for a favored candidate. Such a loophole
would render direct contribution limits virtually meaningless." Id.
89. 424 U.S. at 47.
90. Id. at 26-27. The Court later defined the exchange that is feared as "dollars for political
favors." FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 497.
91. 424 U.S. at 26-27. The government also offered two "ancillary" interests served by
contribution limits. Id. at 25-26. The interest in equalizing political voices was expressly rejected.
Id. at 48-49. See supra note 78. The interest in curbing the skyrocketing costs of political
campaigns, according to the Buckley majority, was not served by the contribution limits. 424
U.S. at 26 n.27.
92. Id. at 45.
93. Id. at 47. But see Cox, Constitutional Issues in the Regulation of the Financing of
Election Campaigns, 31 CitV. ST. L. REV. 395, 411 (1982) ("The assumption made by the
Court . . .seems utterly implausible as applied to expenditures by political committees, organ-
izations whose primary purpose is to promote the election of a candidate or candidates .
See infra text accompanying notes 167-75.
94. 424 U.S. at 259-62 (White, J., separate opinion). "It would make little sense to me,
and apparently made none to Congress, to limit the amounts an individual may give to a
candidate or spend with his approval but fail to limit the amounts that could be spent on his




coin. '- 96 Unlike Justice White, however, Justices Burger and Blackmun would
have struck down both types of regulations as violative of the First Amend-
ment. 97
2. Post-Buckley Supreme Court decisions
The distinctions drawn in Buckley between contribution restrictions and
limits on independent expenditures have been sharpened in subsequent Su-
preme Court rulings on the constitutionality of campaign finance reform.98
These later decisions, which have uniformly upheld contribution limits in
the context of candidate election campaigns and struck down spending limits,
have focused on two analytical themes first developed in Buckley. First, the
governmental interest in preventing actual or apparent corruption justifies
the regulation of contributions but not that of expenditures. Second, the
right of individuals and PACs to spend political money deserves greater
constitutional protection than the right to contribute directly to candidates.
These guideposts help to understand what one commentator has characterized
as the Court's "meandering path" in campaign finance regulation.99
The sufficiency of the anti-corruption goal and the lesser scrutiny applied
to contribution restrictions has allowed the post-Buckley Court to sustain
federal limits on contributions.0 In FEC v. National Right to Work Com-
mittee,'0 1 a unanimous Court deferred to congressional concern for corrup-
tion and upheld the federal restriction on the ability of segregated fund
PACs to solicit contributions.'0 2 In California Medical Association v. FEC03
the Court upheld the FECA's $5,000 annual limit on contributions to multi-
candidate PACs. A 5-4 majority of the Court agreed with Congress that
limiting contributions to multi-candidate PACs was necessary to prevent
evasion of the contribution limits upheld in Buckley.°4 The plurality decision
in California Medical Association noted the constitutional distinction between
independent spending and direct contributions. Unlike independent expen-
96. Id. at 241 (Burger, C.J., separate opinion).
97. Id. at 241-46 (Burger, C.J., separate opinion); id. at 290 (Blackmun, J., separate
opinion).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 100-29.
99. Nicholson, supra note 62, at 510.
100. Even in Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981), where the
Court struck down a city ordinance's $250 limit on contributions to PACs opposing or
supporting ballot measures, the analysis first adopted in Buckley was affirmed. Because a
referendum campaign imposing rent control lacked the danger of candidate corruption, the
contribution limit was held to be unnecessarily and unconstitutionally burdensome on the
organization's right of association. Id. at 297-99.
101. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
102. See supra note 86.
103. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
104. Id. at 198. Justice Blackmun agreed with the plurality's view that the $5,000 ceiling was
necessary to prevent evasion of the contribution limits, but wrote separately to apply a closer
scrutiny to the contribution limits. Id. at 202-03 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion).
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ditures, which are a direct expression of the spender's views, "the transfor-
mation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone
other than the contributor."°"5 Thus, contributions by the California Medical
Association (CMA) to CALPAC, the PAC created and sponsored by the
CMA, represent "speech by proxy," 0 6 which is not entitled to full first
amendment protection.1 07
The Court's inclination to strike down restrictions on independent expen-
ditures has extended to situations where the spender assumes the corporate
form. 08 In FEC v. Massachus'tts Citizens for Life, Inc., °9 the Court's most
recent decision concerning campaign finance legislation, the ban on corporate
independent expenditures was held unconstitutional when applied to non-
stock, ideological corporations."l 0 Central to the Court's decision was the
constitutional distinction between campaign contributions and independent
spending. "We have consistently held that restrictions on contributions
require less compelling justification than restrictions on independent spend-
ing." " Thus; National Right to Work Committee, where federal restrictions
were upheld, was distinguished as a case involving contributions, not expen-
ditures." 2 The interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of cor-
ruption was again cited as a legitimate state interest." 3 Nonetheless, the
Massachusetts Citizens for Life majority considered the FEC's concern for
the unfair deployment of wealth unwarranted in the context of an ideological
corporation.'4
105. Id. at 197. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)) (emphasis in original).
106. Id. at 196.
107. Id. The "proxy speech" approach, used to support statutory restrictions on contribu-
tions, was later held not to apply in the context of expenditure limitations. FEC v. National
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 450, 494-95 (1985).
108. Cf. FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982) (danger of corruption
posed by a non-profit, ideological corporation sufficient to sustain contribution solicitation
restrictions).
109. 107 S. Ct. 616 (1986).
110. Id. at 630-31. At the center of the controversy was a newsletter published by MCFL,
which urged readers to vote pro-life. Id. at 620. Because the newsletter represented "express
advocacy" of several pro-life candidates, id. at 623, MCFL was held in violation of 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b, which requires all such corporate expenditures to be made through a segregated fund
PAC. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53.
111. 107 S. Ct. at 627. See also id. at 630 ("[Tjhe government enjoys greater latitude in
limiting contributions than in regulating independent expenditures."). But see id. at 634 (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting) ("The distinction between contributions and independent expenditures
is not a line separating black from white.").
112. Id. at 629.
113. Id. at 627.
114. Id. at 628. "Groups such as MCFL . . .do not pose that danger of corruption."
Because the nonstock corporation "was formed to disseminate political ideas, not to amass
capital," its resources reflect the popularity of its views, not its economic success. Id. The
Court noted three characteristis of MCFL which were essential to the Court's decision. First,
MCFL was formed expressly to promote political ideas. Second, it had no shareholders. Third,
it was not connected with a business corporation. Id. at 631. Corporations which do not possess
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The Court reiterated the broad range of constitutional protection afforded
to independent spending and named PACs as beneficiaries of that protection
in FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee"5 (NCPAC).
There, the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) and
the Fund for a Conservative Majority (FCM) challenged the constitutionality
of the federal $1,000 ceiling on independent expenditures on behalf of a
presidential candidate receiving public financing." 6 Both PACs solicited and
spent large sums of money in support of President Reagan's 1980 campaign
and his re-election effort in 1984.117 Having concluded that the PACs'
independent expenditures exceeded $1,000 and were prohibited by federal
law, the Court declared the ceiling on such spending unconstitutional."'
The analysis used in Buckley once again proved crucial. The Court,
however, went further in NCPAC, asserting that "the expenditures at issue
in this case produce speech at the core of the First Amendment.""' 9 The
funneling of contributions through PACs did not diminish the first amend-
ment interests. The decision in California Medical Association, which upheld
contribution limits to multi-candidate political committees, was distinguished
on two grounds. First, California Medical Association involved contribution
limits instead of the spending ceiling challenged in NCPAC. Second, the
"proxy speech" rationale for according less deference to restrictions on
contributions to noncandidate committees was rejected in the context of
independent spending. The "proxy speech" rationale did not apply, the
Court reasoned, because contributors approved of the PACs' messages.'
20
Another rationale for striking down the independent spending ceiling in
NCPAC was the need to protect rights of association. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the NCPAC majority, characterized groups such as NCPAC and
these characteristics must establish a segregated fund PAC to make independent expenditures.
See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982).
115. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
116. The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, I.R.C. §§ 9001-13 (1987), provides for
public funding of presidential candidates who agree to certain restrictions on expenditures and
contributions. Id. at §§ 9003-04. The Act also provides for criminal penalties for any political
committee, other than the candidate's official committee, which incurs an expenditure to further
the candidate's campaign in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000. Id. § 9012(f).
117. The total in independent expenditures for Ronald Reagan's 1984 campaign was $9,839,033
for NCPAC and $1,638,621 for FCM. See FEC INDEX OF INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES, 1983-
1984, at 12, 28.
118. 470 U.S. at 496-501. The Court had previously considered the constitutionality of §
9012(f) in Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 455 U.S. 129 (1982) (O'Connor, J., not participating). Because an equalLy-
divided affirmance is not entitled to precedential weight, Trans World Airlines v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 73 n.8 (1977), the Court in NCPAC was not bound by the Schmitt decision,
which held § 9012(f) unconstitutional. One commentator has suggested that the significance of
Schmitt is that three justices were temporarily persuaded that PAC independent spending was
potentially corruptive. Nicholson, supra note 62, at 517.
119. 470 U.S. at 493.
120. Id. at 494-95.
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FCM as "mechanisms by which large numbers of individuals of modest
means can join together" to amplify their political voice.1 21 The Court,
typically hostile to the theory that the first amendment exists to equalize the
wealthy and impoverished in political debate, viewed PACs as a necessary
counterbalance to the wealthy who may buy expensive media ads on their
own. 1'2 2 The Court distinguished National Right to Work Committee'23 as a
decision involving the constitutional rights of corporations, and declared
that "PAC's expenditures are entitled to full First Amendment protection."' 124
The Court reaffirmed the Buckley holding that only the prevention of
actual or perceived corruption justifies restrictions on campaign financing.
As in Buckley, the anti-corruption interest in NCPAC was held irrelevant
because independent expenditures posed no danger of a political quid pro
quo. "'25 The majority apparently did not view the close contacts between the
PACs and the candidate as significant. 2 The Court also suggested a nar-
rowing of its definition of corruption. A candidate's or incumbent's change
in his or her own position on issues in response to PAC spending, the Court
noted, "can hardly be called corruption."' 1 7 The FEC had attempted to
121. Id. at 495. But see Adamany, PAC's and the Democratic Financing of Politics, 22
ARIZ. L. REV. 569, 596 (1980) ("The real or effective financial constituency in these circum-
stances is the PAC and its leadership, not the small givers to PAC campaign warchests. The
candidate knows the programs and objectives of the PAC, and it is to the PAC officers that
preferred access is given."); Cox, supra note 93, at 411 (undue influence flows to PAC managers,
not PAC contributors).
122. 470 U.S. at 495. The Court previously rejected the governmental interest in equalizing
the economic ability of individuals to communicate politically as a justification for campaign
finance legislation. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 48-49. See also supra note 78.
123. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
124. 470 U.S. at 495-96. A fuller discussion of PACs' first amendment rights is found in
Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489, 499-500 (D.D.C. 1980).
125. 470 U.S. at 497. The exchange of official favors is hypothetically possible, the Court
noted, but unlikely without cooperation and prearrangement. Id. at 498.
126. For example, the founder of NCPAC was Reagan's Midwest coordinator for the
authorized presidential election campaign in 1980. Joint Stipulation of Facts Nos. 75-77, 470
U.S. 480 (1985) (No. 83-1032). The NCPAC chairman's brother was on President Reagan's
campaign staff and also served in the Reagan administration. Id. No. 79. The PACs used the
same advertising agents and pollsters as the official campaign. Id. Nos. 86-87, 131. NCPAC
has also obtained briefing sessions with the President and his aides for its largest contributors.
Id. Nos. 50-54, 61-62, 122. In his NCPAC dissent, Justice White noted the "significant contacts"
between PACs and candidates. 470 U.S. at 511 (White, J., dissenting).
127. 470 U.S. at 498. The Court described corruption as "dollars for political favors." Id.
at 497. Excluded from this narrow definition is the concern for the excessive political influence
generated by large sums of money.
The concern behind campaign finance legislation is not about corruption; it is about
the danger that major contributors to successful candidates will receive in return
some excessive measure of influence in the making of public policy. That influence
may be in the form of "access"-open doors and sympathetic ears-or it may be
in some extra weight of information or consideration on the scales of decision in
policymaking. Indeed it may merely arise from the election of officials already
[Vol. 37:611
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demonstrate to the district court a familiar type of corruption by offering
evidence that PAC officials had received high-level appointments in the
Reagan Administration. Newspaper articles and polls purportedly showing
public perception of corruption were also proffered. 28 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court upheld the district court's finding that such evidence was
"evanescent." 1
29
Justice White's dissent vigorously challenged the majority on almost all
the substantive issues raised in NCPAC. He reiterated his belief that the
Buckley distinction between contributions and expenditures was invalid.
Justice White argued that even if the distinction was valid, "'independent'
PAC expenditures function as contributions."' 130 Justice White, himself a
former PAC official,' noted that PAC spending not formally "coordinated"
is still noticed and appreciated by the candidate, and must be closely regu-
lated. 32 Justice White would have also upheld the ceiling limits because
sympathetic to the campaign contributor's values or ideology.
Sorauf, Caught in a Political Thicket: The Supreme Court and Campaign Finance, 3 CONST.
COMMENTARY 97, 104 (1986) [hereinafter Sorauf, Political Thicket].
In NCPAC, the National Congressional Club in an amicus brief argued that appellants tried
to convince the Court to accept the rejected equalization rationale through an expanded
definition of undue influence. Brief for National Congressional Club as Amicus Curiae at 18-
20, NCPAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (No. 83-1032). For a discussion of the differing types of
political influence, and which types are to be avoided, see Nicholson, supra note 62, at 536-
41.
Prior to the imposition of federal ceilings on contribution amounts, large contributions were
considered by some to be a form of multiple voting and multiple representation. See Nicholson,
Campaign Financing and Equal Protection, 26 STAN. L. REv. 815 (1974). See also D. ADAMANY,
FINANCING POLITICS 236 (1969) (multiple voting); H. ALEXANDER, MONEY IN POLrrics 146-49
(1971) (multiple representation). Large independent spending campaigns by PACs may pose
similar dangers.
128. Democratic Party v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 578 F. Supp. 797,
824-27 (E.D.Pa. 1983).
129. 470 U.S. at 499 (quoting 578 F. Supp. at 830). The district court gave several reasons
for rejecting the evidence offered. The Court held the poll results inadmissible because defen-
dants were not given sufficient time to study the results and, alternatively, because the Harris
and Roper surveys did not precisely inquire into the public's perception that PACs corrupt
through independent spending. 578 F. Supp. at 825-26. Although one poll showed that 65
percent of respondents thought that independent expenditures "should be stopped," the district
court found the answer incomplete. Id. at 827. See infra note 215. Finally, the lower court
noted the hearsay problem of poll results. 470 U.S. at 827 n.42. For a critical review of the
district court's and the Supreme Court's standard of such survey results, see Sorauf, Political
Thicket, supra note 127, at 113-15.
130. 470 U.S. at 510 (White, J., dissenting).
131. Justice White had some political experience as head of National Citizens for Kennedy
in the 1960 presidential election. He was also coordinator of John F. Kennedy's preconvention
campaign in Colorado. Wright, supra note 1, at 612.
132. 470 U.S. at 510-11 (White, J., dissenting). In Buckley, Justice White would have deferred
to Congressional judgment since many Congressmen were "seasoned professionals who have
been deeply involved in elective processes and who have viewed them at close range over many
years." 424 U.S. at 261 (White, J., separate opinion).
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PACs operate independently of their contributors and therefore, speak by
proxy. 33
Finally, Justice White expressed concern for the practical effect of large
PAC expenditures on the political process. He feared that "the candidate
may be forced to please the spenders rather than the voters .... ,,34 This
concern for the corruptive potential of independent spending persuaded
Justice Marshall to reverse the view he maintained in Buckley. In NCPAC
he separately dissented, noting the danger of corruption and the illogical
distinction between contributions and independent expenditures.,
The increasing role PACs and independent spending play in elections can
be traced to the FECA and its review by the Supreme Court. 3 6 The power
of the individual to directly influence campaigns was restricted by the FECA
limits on annual contributions, which were upheld in Buckley v. Valeo.' 3"
In striking down comparable spending limits, the Buckley majority noted
that use of the media-"the most effective mode of communication"-is
very expensive. 3 ' Thus, pooling funds to use the media is an efficient exercise
of constitutionally protected spending. In NCPAC, where limits on inde-
pendent spending were struck down, the Court recognized PACs as me-
chanisms for "individuals of modest means [to] join together in organizations
which serve to 'amplif[y] the voice of their adherents." ' 40 More recently, in
Massachusetts Citizens For. Life, 4' where the federal ban on independent
spending by ideological corporations was struck down, the Court again noted
the utility of PACs: "Individuals contribute to a political organization in
part because they regard such a contribution as a more effective means of
advocacy than spending the money under their own personal direction."'' 4
C. The Growth of PACs and Independent Spending
1. Numerical growth of PACs and independent PAC spending
While the Supreme Court has extolled their virtues, PACs have grown
exponentially in numbers and wealth. In 1974, for example, the FEC counted
133. 470 U.S. at 510 (White, J., dissenting). See also Note, The Constitutionality of Regu-
lating Independent Expenditure Committees in Publicly Funded Campaigns, 18 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 679, 689-91 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Constitutionality of Regulating Independent Com-
mittees] (advocating lesser judicial scrutiny to restrictions on speech not funded by speaker).
134. 470 U.S. at 157 (White, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 518-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136. Adamany, Political Parties in the 1980's in MONEY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES
101 (M. Malbin ed. 1984). The author also attributes PACs' success in soliciting and advocacy
to modern technology. Id.
137. 424 U.S. at 29.
138. Id. at 19-20.
139. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
140. Id. at 494 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22). The Buckley court also suggested that
contributors frustrated by the $1,000 ceiling could become personally involved with a PAC's
efforts on behalf of a candidate. 424 U.S. at 22.
141. 107 S. Ct. 616 (1986).
142. Id. at 629.
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608 PACs. In 1987, that figure stood at 4,21 1.43 Similarly, the size of PAC
contributions to congressional candidates has risen. In 1974, $12.5 million
in PAC money went to House and Senate races; for the 1985-86 election
cycle, the FEC reported that over $139 million in PAC contributions were
received by congressional candidates. 1" Perhaps the most revealing statistic
is the growing role of PACs within such races. In the decade between 1972
and 1982, PAC contributions rose from 14 percent to 31 percent of all
monies received by House candidates. 45 Thus, the general increase in the
cost of campaigning does not fully explain the growth in PAC funding.
Simply stated, the money of special interest groups plays an increasingly
larger role in campaign finance.'46
Although a large percentage of PAC money is contributed directly to
campaigns, independent expenditures on a candidate's behalf have become
increasingly popular. In 1978, the first year in which the FEC began to
account separately for independent expenditures by PACs, only $300,000
was spent independently in congressional campaigns. 147 Four years later, that
figure rose to $5.3 million. 48 For the 1985-86 election cycle, over $9.5 million
in PAC money was spent independently to advocate a candidate. 49 The real
power of independent spending, however, lies in presidential election years.
During the 1979-80 election cycle, over $16 million was spent in independent
campaigns; of that amount, $13.7 million was devoted to the presidential
candidates. 50 Total independent spending for the 1984 election was $23.4
million with Senate campaigns receiving a larger share of independent money. 151
143. F. SORAUF, MONEY IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 78 (1988) [hereinafter F. SORAUF, MONEY).
For the 1987-88 reporting period, 4,578 PACs had registered with the FEC. FEC Press Release,
September 8, 1988.
144. F. SORAUlF, MONEY, supra note 143, at 79.
145. F. SORAUF, WHAT PRICE PACS? 39 (1984) [hereinafter F. SoRAUs', WHAT PRICE?]. PAC
contributions to senatorial candidates during the same period went from 12 percent of all
contributions received to 19 percent of all receipts. Id. In the 1980 campaign, those elected to
the House of Representatives received over 29 percent of their campaign funds from PACs.
Id. For a brief discussion of the growth of PACs at the statewide level, see id. at 39; L.
SABATO, PAC POWER 117-21 (1984). See also Budde, supra note 1, at 563-67 (PAC's operation
at state level).
146. PAC contributions comprise a large percentage of all funds received by congressional
leaders. For example, PACs provided over half of the $539,464 that House Speaker Thomas
"Tip" O'Neill raised in 1982. Rep. Daniel Rostenkowski, chairman of the powerful Ways and
Means Committee, received more than half of his $419,438 from PACs. Adamany, Political
Action Committees and Democratic Politics, 1983 DET. C.L. REV. 1013, 1017-18.
147. J. CANTOR, supra note 38, at 26.
148. F. SORAUF, WHAT PRICE?, supra note 145, at 53.
149. FEC Press Release, May 21, 1987, at I.
150. 11 FEC REP. No. 10 p.5 (Oct. 1985).
151. Id. Some suggest that the significance of independent PAC spending is exaggerated by
the expenditure statistics. For example, the fundraising costs of nonconnected PACs may be
reported as independent expenditures. Leatherberry, The Dangers of Reform: A Comment on
Senator Chiles' Position on PACs, 12 J. OF LEGIS. 43, 46-47 (1985). One commentator has
estimated that only one-third of the $10.6 million that PACs spent on Ronald Reagan's behalf
in 1980 went to media advertising. H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1980 ELECTION 131 (1983).
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2. The users and uses of independent spending
A small number of money sources account for this increase in independent
expenditures. In 1984, 80 percent of all independent spending was reported
by ten PACs.12 Seven of those organizations were ideological PACs-those
uniting people of similar philosophical orientations or people sharing similar
positions on specific issues. Another of the top ten independent PAC spen-
ders, the North Carolina Campaign Fund, was organized exclusively to
support the re-election bid of Senator Jesse Helms. These two types of
independent PACs, as opposed to PACs sponsored by corporations, unions
or trade associations, are typically the biggest independent spenders. More
than half of the independent expenditures in the 1985-86 election cycle were
made by nonconnected PACs.' Joseph Cantor, a congressional analyst of
PACs, has suggested that ideological and candidate-oriented PACs use in-
dependent expenditures because they seek to change the philosophical make-
up of government rather than maintain cordial relations with incumbents. 15 4
One common use of independent expenditures-" negative" campaigning-
is uniquely suitable for the goal of changing the philosophical make-up of
government. The most familiar example of this campaign tactic is NCPAC's
$1.2 million effort to oppose the reelection of six liberal Democrat senators
in 1980. The organization used media campaigns to attack the records and
positions of the incumbent senators in order to make them vulnerable to
more conservative challengers.'5 5 Impressed with the results of this tech-
nique, 5 6 PACs used 77 percent of their 1982 independent expenditures in
efforts to oppose (rather than support) a candidate.1 7 Although negative
campaigning has become a smaller percentage of independent spending in
recent years,' the FEC continues to report such expenditures separately.
152. F. SORAUF, MONEY, supra note 143, at 111.
153. Id. at 114.
154. J. CANTOR, supra note 38, at 31. Cf. Latus, supra note 23, at 150 (ideological PACs
use independent spending to "undermine targeted opponents, while their candidate remains
untainted by the mudslinging").
155. "Our goal is a conservative Senate, and this is the best way to get it," said John T.
Dolan, chairman of NCPAC. Light, PACs Are Independent Expenditure Leaders, 1980 CONG.
Q. 1637. NCPAC began its negative campaigns more than a year before the election, long
before the identities of the Republican challenger became known. Jacobson, Money in the 1980
and 1982 Congressional Elections in MONEY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 38 (M.
Malbin ed. 1982).
156. Six senators were targeted by NCPAC: George McGovern of South Dakota; Birch Bayh
of Indiana; Alan Cranston of California; John C. Culver of Iowa; Frank Church of Idaho;
and Thomas Eagleton of Missouri. Only Cranston and Eagleton won re-election. For an
argument that independent PAC spending did not explain the results of the 1980 Senate races,
see Leatherberry, Rethinking Regulation of Independent Expenditures by PACs, 35 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 13, 26-27 (1984).
157. F. SORAUF, WRAT PRICE supra note 148, at 53-54. In 1984, the North Carolina Campaign
Fund, the sixth largest independent PAC spender, used all of its $765,000 in a negative campaign.
FEC Press Release, October 4, 1985, at 2.
158. Only 13 percent of independent spending in the 1986 congressional campaigns was used




A. The Need for Restrictions on Independent PAC Spending
Although the Court has consistently found that PAC spending independent
of a candidate does not pose the same dangers as do direct contributions,
it has recognized the potential harm to the political process. In Buckley,
where the Court operated without a factual record,5 9 it limited the breadth
of its decision. "[lIndependent advocacy . . . does not presently appear to
pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified
with large campaign contributions."' 16 When a dollar limit on independent
expenditures in presidential races was struck down, the Court again recog-
nized the possibility "that candidates may take notice of and reward those
responsible for PAC expenditures . *.".. ,,6 Justice White, congressmen who
regularly participate in political campaigns, commentators, and PAC officials
themselves have identified this potential for corruption. This diverse group's
common view creates a powerful argument in favor of federal restrictions
on independent spending by PACs.
,There are four reasons why PAC spending should be subject to more
stringent federal regulation. First, current independent PAC expenditures
benefit candidates and influence elections to a far greater degree than the
innocuous expenditures described in Buckley. Second, independent spending
campaigns by well-organized PACs constitute loopholes in contribution res-
trictions. Third, PAC spending engenders an appearance of corruption which
taints the political process as much as actual corruption. Finally, coordinated
spending is often easily disguised as an independent expenditure and not
detected as such because the FEC is saddled with heavy evidentiary and
political burdens.
One obstacle to effective limits on PAC expenditures is the higher level
of scrutiny used by the Supreme Court when analyzing statutes involving
restrictions on independent spending. 6 2 Because independent advocacy is
considered more akin to pure speech than symbolic contributions, spending
limits have been struck down while similar contribution ceilings have been
upheld. 163 Some proponents of limiting PAC spending have argued that
channeling money through PACs is "speech by proxy" entitled to only
limited amendment protection.' 64 A Supreme Court plurality initially adopted
159. Buckley reached the Supreme Court on expedited appeal, before the effect of the
legislation on federal campaigns was available for analysis.
160. 424 U.S. at 46 (emphasis added).
161. FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 498.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 84-89.
163. In Buckley, the $1,000 ceiling on contributions was upheld while the $1,000 ceiling on
independent expenditures was struck down. 424 U.S. at 23-51.
164. See 470 U.S. at 513-14 (White, J., dissenting); Note, Constitutionality of Regulating
Independent Committees, supra note 133, at 690-94.
1988]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
this argument in support of limits on contributions to PACs. 65 However,
the Court recently rejected this argument in striking down statutes limiting
PAC spending in presidential campaigns. 166 Although there is some merit to
the "speech by proxy" argument, it will not be discussed here. The govern-
mental interest in reducing the deleterious effect of independent spending is
substantial enough to overcome heightened judicial scrutiny.
1. Corruptive potential
One rationale for limits on independent expenditures is that large PAC
spending campaigns have the same potential for corruption as large contri-
butions. The Supreme Court upheld contribution limits because it recognized
that large contributions are made to ensure that the contributor will have
post-election access to the candidate. 67 The Court, however, struck down
the $1,000 ceiling on independent expenditures because they "provide little
assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterpro-
ductive.' ' 68 Without coordination between the spender and the candidate,
the Court reasoned, the expenditure is less valuable to the candidate and
potentially less corruptive.
Although the Court's observation may have been correct when it was
made in 1976, it is no longer valid. Today's independent spenders are
sophisticated PACs who can and do make effective use of their money. This
sophistication eliminates the need for formal communication with the can-
didate because a PAC can determine independently what spending can most
effectively serve the candidate. Perhaps recognizing the changes in the nature
of campaigns since Buckley, the Court has recently pulled back from its
original view of independent spending. In NCPAC the Court stated that
corruption triggered by independent spending was "hypothetically possi-
ble." 169
The conclusion in Buckley that independent spending is innocuous was
not inaccurate; it is, however, an outdated view. Independent PACs today
make use of technology not known to candidate committees ten years ago.
When the Buckley court discussed the use of independent expenditures it
considered a hypothetical individual who purchases a billboard advertise-
165. California Medical Assoc. v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981). "[Tjhe 'speech by proxy'
that CMA seeks to achieve through its contributions to CALPAC is not the sort of political
advocacy that this Court in Buckley found entitled to full First Amendment protection." Id.
166. 470 U.S. at 495 ("Unlike California Medical Assoc., the present cases involve limitations
on expenditures by PACs, not on the contributions they receive ....").
167. Buckley, 424 U.S. I, 26 (1976). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 838 (D.C.Cir.
1975) (review of congressional findings on role of contributions in the 1972 and 1974 elections).
168. 424 U.S. at 47; NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 498.
169. 470 U.S. at 498. One reason for the Court's pulling back may be the stronger proof of
coordination between PACs and candidates. See supra note 126. Another reason for the Court's
softening position may be that the Buckley court was working in a "factual vacuum." L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 800, 800 n.1 (1982).
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ment. 170 Today, the larger, nationally-based PACs employ electronic mass
mailings to solicit contributions, hire expert pollsters to measure the political
mood of the country, and prepare and disseminate television and radio spots
to deliver their message. The larger PACs also train people to build local
and state affiliates.17 1 In short, today's independent spenders are considerably
more sophisticated than the billboard buyer of the Buckley era.
Because PACs can conduct effective independent spending campaigns, the
potential for candidate recognition of PAC efforts is substantial. Just as
large contributions have a corruptive potential, so do large independent
expenditures. The lack of coordination with the candidate, which allegedly
reduces the power of independent spending, is alleviated by the PAC's own
ability to know what their candidate needs to. win. The media's extensive
coverage of a candidate's campaign provides PACs with the information it
needs. Newspapers and newscasts tell attentive PAC officials which themes
and issues the candidate is emphasizing. Political newsletters can also warn
PACs when their candidate is running out of money or reaching state
spending limits. 17 2 An even more reliable source of information is the network
of consultants, pollsters and other political operatives who deal with party,
candidate and political action committees.'7 Finally, negative campaigns may
be undertaken without guidance from the candidate who is the campaign's
beneficiary. NCPAC did not need to be told by President Reagan's campaign
staff that money spent attacking Walter Mondale would benefit Reagan.
74
Additionally, the lack of candidate control over the money does not reduce
the candidate's gratitude "since the candidate will realize that his or her
financial supporters are doing as much as the law allows."' 7
Perhaps the most accurate barometer of the influence independent spending
wields is its increased popularity among the largest PACs since the Buckley
decision. 76 As the Court has noted, they are efficient users of political
170. 424 U.S. at 46.
171. Latus, supra note 23, at 158-59.
172. E. Daaw, supra note 1, at 136-37. When the 1980 Reagan primary campaign needed
new independent money in New Hampshire and Texas, the Fund for a Conservative Majority
pumped in $60,000 and $80,000, respectively. L. SABATO, supra note 145, at 96-97.
173. E. DRw, supra note 1, at 38-39. Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the independent
North Carolina Congressional Club, which made expenditures on behalf of Ronald Reagan in
1980, said in a television interview: "Well, as you may know, we have an independent effort
going on in North Carolina. Uh, the law forbids me to consult with him lMr. Reagan], and
it's been an awkward situation. I've had to, sort of, uh, talk indirectly with Paul Laxalt [Mr.
Reagan's campaign chairman], and hope that he would pass along .. .uh, and I . . . I think
the messages have gotten through all right .. " Brief for Appellants at 31, Common Cause
v. Schmitt, 455 U.S. 129 (1982) (No. 80-847).
174. Some negative advertising, however, can backfire. NCPAC's negative spending in the
1982 Senate races may have helped the incumbents it was designed to hurt. Cook, Senate
Election: A Dull Affair Compared to 1980's Upheaval, 1982 CONG. Q. 2789, 2792.
175. Nicholson, supra note 78, at 347.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 147-51.
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money.' 7 NCPAC, one of the most powerful PACs, spent over $10 million
independent of a candidate in the 1984 presidential and congressional elec-
tions. 71 In comparison, the PAC spent only $128,000 in direct contribu-
tions. 79 NCPAC literature has noted that the organization's use of independent
spending is a response to the contribution limits of the FECA.' s0 Because
the PAC is limited to contributing only $5,000 to a favored candidate, the
prospect of unlimited independent spending increases the likelihood of the
candidate's success and, thus, the PAC's influence. Moreover, the passage
of time has further diminished the influence of direct contributions. The
ceiling set in 1974 has not been adjusted for inflation. Thus, the growing
cost of campaigns, and the periodical calls in Congress for further limits on
PAC contributions'8 ' only serve to make independent expenditures more
valuable to candidates and PACs.
Ideological PACs generate the majority of independent spending,8 2 but
corporate and trade PACs also recognize the utility of independent spending
on their candidate's behalf. When the American Medical Association wanted
to fill a vacant Colorado legislative seat with a candidate favoring a cap on
malpractice awards, it used AMPAC, the group's political spending arm,
and independent expenditures. Three weeks before the election AMPAC paid
out more than $100,000 for a radio and direct mail campaign to support its
candidate, Democrat David Skaggs.' Despite polls which showed him trail-
ing his opponent up to election day, Skaggs won the race with 51.46 percent
of the vote. Skaggs may disagree with the Supreme Court's characterization
of independent spending as counterproductive. "When you win with 51.5 014
of the vote," Skaggs noted, "and the AMA spent . . .$100,000 versus my
spending $500,000, you can draw your own conclusion.' ' 4
2. Loopholes in contribution restrictions
Because independent spending can help a candidate as much as direct
contributions can, it constitutes a loophole in legislation designed to limit
177. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22; NCPAC, 480 U.S. at 494 (PACs aggregate and amplify
political voices of thousands of small contributors).
178. See FEC INDEX OF INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES, 1983-1984, at 28.
179. See FEC REPORTS ON FINANCIAL ACTIVITY: 1983-84, FINAL REPORT: PARTY AND NON-
PARTY POLITICAL COMMITTEES.
180. "PAC's can only give $5,000 per election directly to a campaign, but in an independent
expenditure campaign they can spend as much as they would like." Everything You Always
Wanted to Know About NCPAC But the Media Wouldn't Tell You, 11 (NCPAC publication)
[hereinafter Everything About NCPAC].
181, Recent congressional bills aimed at controlling PAC contributions focus on placing
limits on the amount of PAC money a candidate may use. See, e.g., H.R. 2490, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 507 (1983).
182. Nonconnected PACs made 93 percent of all independent expenditures in the 1980 federal
election campaigns. Latus, supra note 23, at 149.




the influence of contributions. 185 Therefore, closing these statutory loopholes
is another reason for placing limits on independent spending. Congress
enacted the $1,000 annual limit on independent expenditures, a ceiling equal
to the limit on direct contributions, to protect the legislative scheme of the
FECA.'16 Congress did not want to inhibit spending on issues of public
policy, and therefore limited spending on campaign tactics which "expressly
advocat[ed]" a candidate's election or defeat. 87 Congress inserted a similar
restriction in legislation providing for voluntary financing of presidential
campaigns."8 ' The Supreme Court struck down the loophole-closing provision
two different times, and independent expenditures now provide two loopholes
in campaign finance regulation.
The first loophole created by unlimited independent spending is the evasion
of individual contribution limits. The Court of Appeals in Buckley v. Valeo
upheld the $1,000 ceiling on independent spending as a necessary and nar-
rowly drawn loophole-closing provision.' 89 The Supreme Court justified strik-
ing down the provision because it was ineffective. The $1,000 limit prevented
only large expenditures and failed to reach corruptive expenditures which
"skirted the restriction on express advocacy."'90 Through its narrow statutory
construction, the Court implicitly recognized the independent spending loop-
hole in the FECA's contribution restrictions.' 9' Chief Justice Burger predicted
that the Court's holding on independent expenditures would lead to evasion
of contribution limits' 92 and several commentators agree with this predic-
tion. 93 More important, however, PACs recognize and utilize this loophole.
NCPAC literature bluntly explains why the organization depends on inde-
pendent spending: "PACs can only give $5,000 per election directly to a
185. See infra text accompanying notes 189-206.
186. "If [contribution] limitations are to be meaningful, campaign-related spending by in-
dividuals and groups independent of a candidate must be limited as well." H.R. REP. No.
1239, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974).
187. 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1985). See also H.R. REP. No. 1239, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974)
(only spending which advocates election or defeat of "clearly defined candidate" is subject to
the $1,000 restriction); Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 853 (D.C.Cir. 1975) (same).
188. I.R.C. § 9012(f) (1987).
189. 519 F.2d at 852-53.
190. 424 U.S. at 45.
191. "It would naively underestimate the ingenuity and resourcefulness of persons and groups
desiring to buy influence to believe that they would have much difficulty devising expenditures
that skirted the restriction on express advocacy of election or defeat but nevertheless benefitted
the candidate's campaign." 424 U.S. at 45.
192. "[Tlhe Court's holding will invite avoidance, if not evasion of the intent of the Act,
with 'independent' committees undertaking 'unauthorized' activities in order to escape the limits
on contributions." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 253 (Burger, C.J., separate opinion). Justice White
later considered the Chief Justice's prediction a reality. "The growth of independent PAC
spending has been a direct and openly acknowledged response to the contribution limits in the
FECA." FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 510 (White, J.,
dissenting).
193. Adamany, The Sources of Money: An Overview, 425 ANNALS 17, 30 (1976); Cox, supra
note 93, at 410; Nicholson, supra note 78, at 374.
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campaign, but in an independent expenditure campaign they can spend as
much as they like." '94
A second manner in which unlimited PAC spending circumvents campaign
finance legislation is its effect on publicly-financed presidential races. An
integral part of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act (Fund Act) 9
is the overall limit on candidate expenditures. 9 6 The Fund Act seeks to
replace private contributions with public funding by limiting campaign ex-
penditures (of those candidates accepting public funds) to the amount of the
public subsidy. An important public interest served by public funding-"to
eliminate reliance on large private corporations" '9 -would not be served if
candidates could use public money in addition to private funds. 9 Thus, no
presidential candidate receiving a public subsidy may accept contributions
during the general election.199
As part of this legislative scheme, the Fund Act also prohibits PAC
expenditures exceeding $1,000 on behalf of a publicly-funded presidential
candidate.2°° Like the FECA ceiling on independent spending, which was
struck down in Buckley, the Fund Act provision was intended to close a
loophole in the direct contribution limits.20 Yet, Congress's attempt to limit
independent spending was again struck down by the Court in NCPAC.2°2
Because unlimited PAC spending can be as beneficial and potentially as
corrupting as contributions, 20 3 the unregulated use of independent spending
can defeat one goal of publicly-subsidized presidential campaigns,2 The role
that independent spending played in the 1980 election illustrates the impact
of this legislative loophole.
In 1980 both the incumbent President Carter and the challenger Ronald
Reagan received $29.4 million in public subsidies. In that same year, however,
an additional $10 million was independently spent on Reagan's behalf; in
194. See Everything About NCPAC, supra note 180. See also infra note 205 (another PAC
notes loophole effect of independent expenditures).
195. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-13 (1987).
196. Id. § 9003. In a rare departure from its hostility to spending limits in general, the
Court upheld the expenditure ceilings for publicly-funded presidential candidates. Republican
Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd without opinion, 445 U.S. 955
(1980). For a discussion of this case, see Nicholson, Political Campaign Expenditure Limitations
and the Unconstitutional Condition Doctrine, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 601 (1983). The Buckley
court first suggested the constitutionality of candidate spending ceilings in publicly-funded
presidential campaigns. 424 U.S. at 57 n.65.
197. S. REP. No. 689, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1974).
198. 487 F. Supp. at 285.
199. I.R.C. § 9003(b)(2) (1987).
200. Id. § 90i2(f).
201. S. REP. No. 689, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974).
202. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 167-75.
204. Federal subsidies were designed in part to reduce the "deleterious influence of large
contributions." 424 U.S. at 91. The Court upheld public financing of presidential candidates
as a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to legislate for the "general welfare." Id.
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contrast, only $42,000 was spent to bolster President Carter's campaign.2 °5
The figures on independent spending continued to favor the Republican
candidate in 1984, when Walter Mondale was outspent by Reagan supporters,
$15.8 million to $804,000. 206 Although there has been much debate concerning
the practical effect of independent money on final election results, no
quantifiable evidence exists. However, the power of $15 million worth of
favorable media advertising should not be underestimated.
PAC spending can also be used to evade state spending limits for presi-
dential primaries. When the 1980 Reagan campaign approached the $294,000
expenditure ceiling in New Hampshire, for example, the Fund for a Con-
servative Majority pumped in $60,000 to aid the candidate in that crucial
state. 2 The PAC money amounted to a 20 percent spending hike for Reagan
in that politically significant primary.
3. Apparent corruption
A third reason for restricting PAC expenditures is closely related to the
two reasons offered above. The power of independent PAC spending to
benefit candidate campaigns and evade contribution restrictions creates the
appearance of corruption. The Supreme Court in Buckley described the
appearance of corruption as being "[of] almost equal concern" as actual
quid pro quo arrangements. 208 This unusual judicial concern for appearances
is a recognition that maintaining public confidence in a representative gov-
ernment is essential. 2°9 The Court more recently noted that preventing ap-
parent corruption is a "legitimate and compelling government interest. 210
205. FEC REPORTS ON FINANCIAL ACTIVITY, 1979-1980: FINAL REPORT, PARTY AND NON-
PARTY POLITICAL COMMITTEES 117. At least one of the groups supporting Ronald Reagan in
1980 was honest about the power of independent PAC spending to evade the contribution
limits. The group, Americans for Change, explained its solicitation: "Reagan for President in
'80 is being sponsored by Americans for Change because federal campaign financing laws
prohibit national candidates from accepting personal contributions since they receive federal
funds." Exhibits to Appendix I to the Jurisdictional Statement at 4b, Common Cause v.
Schmitt, 455 U.S. 129 (1982) (No. 80-874) (quoted in Cox, supra note 93, at 401-02).
One commentator charted the source of all funds in the 1980 presidential general election.
Alexander, supra note 36, at 43. The $11.2 million funding advantage that Ronald Reagan held
over the incumbent Jimmy Carter was roughly equal to the $10.5 million advantage that the
challenger had in independent PAC spending. Id. at 54.
206. FEC Press Release, October 4, 1985, at 2.
207. Light, supra note 155, at 1639.
208. 424 U.S. at 27. See also FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 59 U.S. at 210 (1982).
"The government interest in preventing both actual corruption and the appearance of corruption
of elected representatives has long been recognized ..... Id.
209. CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973).
210. FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985)
(emphasis added). The Court's language suggests that the "compelling" interest will justify
limits on independent expenditures even under the stricter scrutiny applied to such legislation.
See supra note 84.
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Thus, the prevention of perceived corruption provides a justification for
restricting independent spending.
The enforcement of a statutory scheme aimed at regulating independent
spending and reducing the appearance of corruption poses difficult questions.
On whose perceptions do the courts base their judgments? What type of
evidence is relevant? How much evidence is sufficient? Anecdotal evidence
is prevalent. Any public forum on campaign finance reflects a general concern
for the influence of PAC money.21' Many members of Congress express
similar views.21 1 Survey research showing the public's concern for the cor-
ruptive potential of independent spending is perhaps the best evidence sup-
porting the argument for regulation.211
The strongest offer of proof for the proposition that independent PAC
spending creates the appearance of corruption was raised by NCPAC plain-
tiffs in the district court.2 14 The plaintiffs offered the results of two nation-
wide telephone surveys which revealed a public distrust of PACs and
independent spending.2"5 However, the trial court held the poll results in-
admissible on evidentiary grounds.2 16 The court held that "massive political
distrust" in PACs or PAC methods was not sufficient to justify independent
spending limits. 2 7 The court noted, however, that survey research demon-
211. E.g., Money in Politics: A Panel Discussion, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 463 (1983)
(transcript from the Symposium on Campaign Finance Reform).
212. The concern expressed by Rep. Matthew F. McHugh (Dem.-N.Y.) is typical:
The average citizen sees increasing amounts of money going to political campaigns
because of a special interest and concludes, in many cases, at least, that this is
corrupting the process. It may not be true, but the perception is certainly there and
that is as important as the reality itself.
Sorauf, Political Thicket, supra note 127, at 113. See also supra note 2.
213. See generally Note, Independent Expenditures: Can Survey Research Establish a Link
to Declining Citizen Confidence in Government?, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 763 (1983) (noting
Supreme Court's willingness to receive such empirical evidence). But see Sorauf, Political
Thicket, supra note 123, at 109-15 (Court's standards make proving appearance of corruption
difficult).
214. 578 F. Supp. 797, 824-27 (D.D.C. 1983).
215. One poll question asked:
Since 1971 (sic) nearly every presidential candidate has chosen to receive Federal
funds rather than raise his money from outside sources. But in recent elections
some private interest groups have spent very large sums of money on television
advertising to support a particular candidate. Some people say this is quite all right
and very different from giving the same amount of money directly to the candidate.
Others say it is a purely technical way of getting around the 1971 law and should
be stopped. Do you think it is all right or should be stopped?
Question reprinted in Sorauf, Political Thicket, supra note 127, at 113. An abridged version
of the question appears at 578 F. Supp at 827. Sixty-five percent of the poll's respondents
thought independent spending "should be stopped." Id.
216. See supra note 129.
217. 578 F. Supp. at 825. The Court requires the public to have a specific opinion of
independent expenditures, a phenomenon which the public does not fully comprehend. "Public
opinion will be about larger issues-about 'big money' in a generalized system of campaign
finance." Sorauf, Political Thicket, supra note 127, at 114.
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strating the public's perception of independent PAC spending as corruptive
could "save" a statutory limit. 2 s
4. Difficulties in regulating the "independent" requirement
The focus of arguments for a ceiling on independent PAC expenditures is
an increasing amount of evidence revealing the corruptive potential of spend-
ing.1 9 PAC spending coordinated with a candidate is regulated as a contri-
bution to and an expenditure by the candidate while uncoordinated spending
is not. 220 The FEC has the responsibility to investigate coordination and to
determine if the statutory limits have been exceeded. 22' The FEC, however,
has been criticized for its weak enforcement record.222 The difficulty in
proving that PAC spending was coordinated with the candidate, combined
with the FEC's lack of political prowess, provide final reasons for placing
effective limits on potentially corruptive independent expenditures. An ex-
amination of FEC procedures reveal the inadequacy of current PAC spending
regulation.
The FEC has exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of the FECA
that create civil liability. 223 Before any person or PAC can be investigated
for improper coordination with a candidate, four of the six Commissioners
must find "reason to believe" a violation has occurred.224 The FEC's decision
to dismiss a complaint may be appealed to federal district court. 225 The
Court has acknowledged the FEC's "sole discretionary power, '2 6 however,
and traditionally has afforded great deference to the agency's decisions.2 27
The FEC's decision will be reversed only if its interpretation was arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 28 Thus, the FEC's standard of proof
for a showing of improper coordination is crucial for effective regulation of
independent spending.
218. 578 F. Supp. at 825.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 170-84.
220. 11 C.F.R. § 109.1(c) (1987).
221. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(2) (1985).
222. See CAMPAIGN FINANCE STUDY GROUP, INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, KENNEDY SCHOOL OF
GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION
CAMPAIGN ACT 1972-1978, at 114-15 (1979) [hereinafter HARVARD ANALYSIS OF FECA] (prepared
for Congressional Commission on House Administration); Novak & Cobb, supra note 15, at
35; O'Connor, supra note 57; Comment, Campaign Finance Re-Reform, supra note 57, at 688-
91. According to NCPAC director John T. Dolan, "The Federal Election Commission has
defined independent expenditures to the degree that it is meaningless." MacPherson, The New
Right Brigade, Wash. Post,,Aug. 10, 1980, at F-1, col. 1.
223. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(1) (1985).
224. Id. § 437g(a)(2).
225. 1d. § 437g(a)(8).
226. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 112 n. 153.
227. FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981) ("[T]he
Commission is precisely the type of agency to which deference should presumptively be
afforded.") Id.
228. Id. at 31, 37.
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The FEC's standard for determining what constitutes coordination between
a PAC and a candidate's campaign can be criticized on two fronts. First, a
subjective inquiry into the parties' state of mind makes difficult the discovery
of coordinated spending disguised as independent expenditures. An expen-
diture is presumed to be coordinated if a candidate or an agent shares polls
or plans with a spender, but only if made "with a view toward having an
expenditure made. ' 229 A second weakness in FEC regulation of PAC spend-
ing is that the FEC requires a showing of direct coordination between PAC
officials and a candidate's campaign staff. When reviewing a complaint of
improper coordination between Ronald Reagan's 1980 campaign and five
PACs who spent heavily on his behalf, the FEC's General Counsel suggested
a heavy evidentiary burden. "Absent a showing of actual agreement to use
the media for purposes of coordinating activity, it would be very difficult
to sustain a finding of cooperation and coordination .... "230 Evidence of
interlocking memberships among the Reagan campaign committee and PAC
policy-making committees, indirect communication through the media, and
the use of common vendors was insufficient to trigger an FEC investigation.
21
The state-of-mind standard and the direct coordination requirement make
the effective regulation of independent spending extremely difficult.
While the heavy evidentiary burden makes difficult the task of demon-
strating an illegal exchange of political favors, the political position of the
FEC makes its task even more formidable. Because the FEC receives its
authority and its funding from congressional legislation, it is unwilling, or
unable, to diligently investigate individual congressmen and their ties to
PACs. One can understand the FEC's unwillingness. For example, shortly
after the FEC conducted its first audit of a congressional candidate, Congress
stripped the FEC of its power to conduct such random audits. The loss of
the agency's most powerful enforcement weapon came after its first audit
revealed improprieties in the campaign finances of James J. Delaney, chair-
man of the House Rules Committee. 2 2 The FEC apparently did its job too
well.
The FEC's inability to perform its enforcement duties effectively is also
understandable. The FEC's staff has been reduced 13 percent since 1980,
during a time in which the number of PACs it oversees doubled. 23 3 The
FEC's budget, averaging near $13 million a year, is one of the smallest of
the federal agencies. 234 Every year, congressmen-each one a potential can-
229. 11 C.F.R. § 109(a)(4)(i)(A) (1987).
230. Joint Exhibit 9, Common Cause v. FEC, 655 F. Supp. 619 (D.D.C. 1986) (No. 83-
2199), cited with approval in, Common Cause v. FEC, 655 F. Supp. at 624.
231. Common Cause, 655 F. Supp. at 624.
232. O'Connor, supra note 57, at 26.
233. Id. Some congressional leaders may be more interested in FEC regulation of PACs than
others. In 1986, for example, more than two dozen PACs registered with the FEC had been
set up by congressmen. Benenson, In the Struggle for Influence, Members' PACs Gain Ground,
1986 CONG. Q. 1751.
234. O'Connor, supra note 57, at 26.
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didate for re-election-decide the FEC's economic power to regulate their
own future campaigns. One former chairman of the FEC has called the
agency's lack of independence "the most serious impediment" to effective
enforcement of federal campaign finance law.23 5
Because coordinated spending among PACs and candidates often goes
undetected and unpunished, the corruption generated by such a scheme goes
unchecked. The power of noncoordinated PAC spending to benefit candidate
campaigns represents a similar threat to the goals of federal campaign finance
legislation. Current restrictions on the amount of PAC contributions, de-
signed to limit the influence of PAC money, are evaded through unlimited
independent expenditures. Finally, apparent corruption by PAC money weak-
ens citizen confidence in the electoral process and government officials.
Because the substantial influence of PAC spending on federal campaigns is
a relatively recent phenomenon, the Supreme Court decisions striking down
federal limits on the campaign technique are outdated. There is growing
evidence which supports the need for new legislation to control this phenom-
enon and its impact on the American political process.
IV. SUGGESTED REFORMS
The growth in independent PAC spending and its unlimited potential has
generated a variety of reform proposals. The approaches to restricting the
role of independent spending are as varied as the perceived problems of the
phenomenon. In fact, each proposal attempts to mitigate a particular weak-
ness within the current federal regulatory scheme. This narrow focus, how-
ever, is the cause of each proposal's inherent flaw. Thus, the proposed
reforms for regulating independent spending fail in much the same way as
past campaign finance legislation has failed. Campaign money restricted in
one way will surface in another. 2 6 A brief review of the available reform
options demonstrates this inevitable characteristic of campaign finance re-
form and the need for a simple, yet effective, solution to unlimited PAC
spending.
Some proposals are designed to compensate the candidate who is the target
of PAC negative advertising or whose opponent is receiving independent
spending support. One type of proposed compensatory legislation focuses
on the broadcast laws. According to the proposal, broadcasters would be
235. Curtis, Reflections on Voluntary Compliance Under the Federal Election Campaign Act,
29 CASE W. RES. 830, 851 (1979). Another former FEC chairman has noted the Commission's
lack of independence: "You can't ignore that incumbents write the laws the Commission
enforces; they have control over the Commission's budget . . . If that isn't enough, a congres-
sional oversight committee monitors our performance and activity." H. ALEXANDER & B.
HAGGERTY, THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT AFTER A DECADE OF REFORM 116 (1981)
(quoting former FEC chairman John McGarry) (cited in Comment, Campaign Finance Re-
Reform, supra note 57, at 690 n.108).
236. Cf. Adamany, supra note 146, at 1015 ("Changes in any aspect of campaign funding
have an impact on all others.").
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required to give an equal amount of free broadcast time to congressional
candidates facing independent spending campaigns. 7 Critics contend that
such legislation would only prompt increases in the cost of broadcast ad-
vertising or discourage television and radio stations from airing independent
campaign ads. 23
Another type of compensatory legislation is related to proposed public
funding of congressional candidates. Congress's most recent campaign fi-
nance bill, for example, would provide additional public funds to candidates
who are attacked, or whose opponent is supported, by $10,000 or more in
independent spending. 239 The prospect of additional public funding for the
opposing candidate, like the prospect of free broadcast time, would suppos-
edly discourage independent PAC spending. These proposals, however, would
also penalize the candidate, who is the presumed beneficiary of PAC spending-
even if the PAC money is uninvited and unwelcomed. Under these regulatory
schemes, independent spending would assume an even greater and more
distorting role in campaign finance.
A simpler and more logical way to curb the excesses of independent
spending is to regulate more strictly the coordination between PACs and the
candidates they support. Closer regulation would reduce the level of inde-
pendent PAC spending to that which is truly "independent." The Supreme
Court implicitly recognized the importance of FEC enforcement when it
presumed that coordinated spending would be treated as contributions. 240
More effective regulation of independent spending would require the use of
objective criteria, rather than the present "state of mind" standard. 241 Among
the objective factors used in analyzing whether a channel of communication
exists between a candidate and a PAC are: an exchange of employees between
candidate committees and PACs; shared polling data and mailing lists, and
a substantial number of common vendors. 242 The latest congressional attempt
to reform campaign finance included these factors in its revised definition
of "independent expenditures." Also included was any consultation between
the spender and the candidate's staff about "the candidate's plans, projects,
or needs" and any spending by one "seeking or obtaining any legislative
benefit or consideration. 241
237. E.g., S. 1806, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 315).
238. E.g., Pressman, Senate to Vote on Limiting PAC Contributions, 1985 CONG. Q. 2445.
239. S. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 504(a)(4) (1987). See also Note, FEC v. NCPAC: Judicial
Misinterpretation of Buckley v. Valeo and a Proposed Remedy, 14 J. OF LEGIS. 107, 121-23
(1987) (proposing public funding of candidates whose opponents are supported by independent
spending).
240. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 n.53 (1976).
241. Comment, Campaign Finance Re-Reform, supra note 57, at 695. Coordination is
presumed when an expenditure is made "[b]ased on information about the candidate's plans
... provided to the expending person by the candidate .. .with a view toward having an
expenditure made." 11 C.F.R. § 109.1(b)(4)(i)(A) (1987) (emphasis added).
242. Comment, Campaign Finance Re-Reform, supra note 57, at 695-97.
243. S. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 6 (1987).
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A new standard for measuring the independence of PAC spending would
ease the FEC's evidentiary burden, but not its political burden. A former
FEC chairman has questioned the Commission's ability to regulate the
incumbents who control the commission and its funding.2 " Because the FEC
must turn to Congress for funding and authority, "Congress can and will
undo anything the FEC does that the Congress does not like. '245 The
structure of the Commission also gives incumbents an opportunity to exert
pressure. The yearly change in the chair of the Commission prevents indi-
vidual commissioners from building an independent power base.24 Reducing
the FEC's contact with Congress to only formal communications and ex-
tending the length of terms for commissioners are suggested reforms that
would bring about the political independence the FEC needs. 247 However,
even a more independent FEC and closer regulation of improperly coordi-
nated PAC spending will not reduce the corruptive potential of unlimited
independent spending, particularly when direct contributions remain subject
to statutory ceilings.
Because many attribute the increase in independent spending to the federal
ceilings on direct contribution amounts, another approach to curbing PAC
spending involves increases in current contribution limits. This approach is
based on the belief that unrealistically low ceilings on contributions are the
reason for the increased use of independent expenditures. 24 Herbert Alex-
ander, a longtime proponent of minimal campaign finance regulation, has
suggested that the $1,000 individual contribution limit be increased to $5,000
and that the $25,000 aggregate ceiling be repealed. 249 Several campaign
finance reform bills of the past decade have included such provisions. 2 0 The
"Level-Up" approach to campaign finance reform, which advocates a min-
imum floor of public funding and the repeal of candidate spending ceilings,
also calls for increases in-if not the repeal of-contribution limits. 2 1 With
no overall spending ceilings and significantly increased contribution levels,
the great need for independent PAC spending "would simply not exist. ' 252
244. Curtis, supra note 235, at 853-55.
245. Id. at 853. See text accompanying notes 232-35.
246. HARVARD ANALYSIS OF FECA, supra note 222, at 114.
247. Curtis, supra note 235, at 853-55.
248. J. CANTOR, supra note 38, at 62; Alexander, supra note 205, at 49; Latus, supra note
23, at 150; Leatherberry, supra note 151, at 50.
249. Alexander, Making Sense About Dollars in the 1980 Presidential Campaigns in MONEY
AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 32 (M. Malbin ed. 1982).
250. For a discussion of proposed legislation designed to encourage direct contributions, see
J. CANTOR, supra note 38, at 63-65.
251. See generally Fleischman & McCorkle, supra note 81 (approach calls for increasing
overall amount and diversity of speech by placing more money in hands of candidates and
lifting current contribution and expenditure ceilings). Cf. Adamany, supra note 146, at 1016
("American politics is not characterized by excessive spending, but rather by financial under-
nourishment.").
252. Fleischman & McCorkle, supra note 81, at 285.
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Proposals to lift current restrictions on contributions can be criticized for
two reasons. First, an increase in contribution levels can resurrect the danger
of corruption inherent in large contributions.53 Second, the ability to give
more money directly may not deter the wealthier supporters of PACs from
contributing as much as the law will allow and then using PACs to spend
additional money independently. Consequently, raising contribution levels
may promote evils which were the original focus of the FECA regulations
while failing to address the current problems generated by unlimited inde-
pendent spending.
The most effective way to curb independent spending would be a ceiling
limit similar to those previously struck down by the Supreme Court.2 54 The
Court's holding that annual limits on independent expenditures is unconsti-
tutional is based on the belief that these spending schemes pose no danger
of corruption and is, therefore, subject to revision. 255 Reform-minded leg-
islators should note Court language suggesting that judicial or legislative
findings of corruptive potential would support a limit on independent spend-
ing. 256 Because the FEC officially has found few instances of collusion
between candidates and PACs, the danger of corruption may be difficult to
demonstrate. Nonetheless, a Congressional fact-finding committee free from
the evidentiary burdens imposed on the FEC may be able to demonstrate
the undue influence of past PAC spending campaigns and the potential for
corruption in future PAC expenditures.
A separate but related justification for re-imposing limits on independent
spending is the declining citizen confidence in government and the electoral
process. The Court has consistently held that the appearance of corruption
threatens American democracy as much as actual corruption. 25 7 Anecdotal
evidence of the public's distrust in PAC spending exists but is insufficient
as proof of perceived corruption.25 Survey research that links declining
citizen confidence in the political process to independent PAC spending,
253. Nicholson, supra note 62, at 561.
254. FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
255. Cf. "Neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is
absolute." 424 U.S. at 25 (quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1967)).
256. 470 U.S. at 510 n.7 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46).
"The possibility was . . . left open [in Buckley] that unforseen developments in the financing
of campaigns might make the need for restricting 'independent' expenditures more compelling.
The exponential growth in PAC expenditures, accompanied by an equivalent growth in public
and congressional concern, suggests that independent expenditures may well prove to be more
serious threats than they appeared in 1976. The time may come when the governmental interests
in restricting such expenditures will be sufficiently compelling to satisfy not only Congress but
a majority of this Court as well." Id. (citations omitted). See also First Nat'l Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978) (record or legislative findings of corruptive potential would
merit judicial attention).
257. 470 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1985). See supra text accompanying notes 208-10.
258. See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
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however, may support a new attempt by Congress to stem the growth of
independent spending.
Legislative findings demonstrating that independent spending is potentially
corruptive may not alone erode the Supreme Court's resistance to expenditure
ceilings. In NCPAC, the $1,000 limit on PAC expenditures was also held
unconstitutionally broad. 2 9 According to the Court: "It is not limited to
multimillion dollar war chests; its terms apply equally to informal discussion
groups that solicit neighborhood contributions. ' ' 260 In the absence of legis-
lative history indicating such an interpretation, the Court declined to construe
the statutory limits as applying only to wealthy PACs or to those whose
contributors have no voice in how their contributions are spent. 261 Thus, any
new attempt by Congress to restrict the amount of independent PAC spending
should address the problem of over-broad legislation. 262
In addition, Congress would have to set an expenditure ceiling which
would not unduly restrict the first amendment rights of PACs. In NCPAC,
the $1,000 limit was analogized to "allowing a speaker in a public hall to
express his views while denying him the use of an amplifying system. ' 263
PACs' dependence on the "indispensable" electronic media and the cost of
media use may require a ceiling much higher than $1,000.26 4 The constitu-
tional values threatened by annual limits on independent spending make the
enactment and defense of such reform a formidable task.
The task may be made less formidable by a proposed ceiling on inde-
pendent PAC spending which is sensitive to these constitutional arguments.
The Court in Buckley noted the growing use of expensive mass media for
the exercise of political expression. 26 The proposed ceiling should, therefore,
be large enough to permit the purchase of newspaper ads and/or radio and
television commercials. 266 The first amendment rights of PACs haxe been
grounded in the political association rights of their members.267 Thus, the
259. 470 U.S. at 498.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 498-99. One proposal to reduce the role of independent PAC spending involves
dollar limits on spending by political committees whose contributors do not participate directly
in PAC decision-making. Comment, Campaign Finance Re-Reform, supra note 57, at 692-94.
262. However, the NCPAC court also doubted the utility of such criteria, calling them
"intolerably vague." 470 U.S. at 499.
263. Id. at 493.
264. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. In contrast to the Court's closer scrutiny of spending limit
amounts, it has been willing to accept the contribution ceilings set by Congress. "If [Congress]
is satisfied that some limit on contributions is necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe,
whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000." Id. at 30 (quoting Buckley
v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 842 (D.C.Cir. 1975)).
265. 424 U.S. at 19 ("[V]irtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society
requires the expenditure of money.").
266. One commentator has called for a ceiling "high enough to allow meaningful entry into
the marketplace of ideas." Nicholson, supra note 62, at 562.
267. FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 494 (1985). See
also Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489, 499-500 (D.D.C. 1980) (political committees
have first amendment rights commensurate with individuals' rights).
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ceiling amount should continue to allow PACs the ability to "amplif[y] the
voice of their adherents." 26
A $75,000 annual ceiling on independent expenditures in support of a
candidate would preserve basic rights to political expression and association
while reducing the deleterious effects of enormous spending campaigns. 269
PACs would not be subject to any overall spending limits, only a ceiling on
how much may be spent on a single candidate. The proposed legislation
would also apply only to funds spent in "express advocacy" of a candidate.
A PAC would be free to spend unlimited amounts to discuss issues, inform
the electorate, and get out the vote. The $75,000 ceiling would not stifle
PAC spending to such an extent that the larger PACs would have no vehicle
through which they can funnel their political money. Finally, the $75,000
figure, much higher than the $5,000 limit on contributions from multican-
didate PACs, may be more attractive to those hesitant to place restrictions
on popular PACs.
V. CONCLUSION
Laws regulating political spending and giving are an unnatural mechanism.
Yet, without such regulation the electoral process would become a market-
place driven by those with economic power. Congress has sought to preserve
the democratic element of candidate campaigns by placing restrictions on
contributions and expenditures and, for presidential campaigns, by replacing
private money with public subsidy. The contribution limits upheld in Buckley
v. Valeo dramatically reduced the corruptive potential of unlimited individual
contributions. The interest in curbing such excessive influence was sufficient
to sustain the burden on contributors' first amendment rights, yet did not
justify similar restrictions on independent spending. The low ceilings on
direct contributions and the unlimited potential for independent spending
have transformed the latter into a powerful vehicle for political money. The
need for nationwide fundraising and sophisticated media campaigns has
made PACs more efficient independent spenders than individuals.
Just as independent PAC spending has become the new vehicle for large
sums of political money, it has become the new source of undue influence.
Informal coordination between PACs and the candidates they support raises
skepticism over the true independence of independent spending. The large
sums spent by some PACs raise much of the same concern for corruption
that large contributions once did. Well-financed PACs frustrated by the
contribution limits have turned to independent expenditures, thus defeating
the original purpose of the contribution restrictions.
No easy solution exists to the problems generated by independent PAC
spending. Legislation granting free broadcast time or additional public fund-
268. 470 U.S. at 494 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22).
269. The ceiling amount may be staggered for different offices. For example, the ceiling may
be lower for House of Representatives candidates and higher for presidential candidates.
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ing to candidates opposing PAC-supported candidates would penalize those
who do not seek or want PAC expenditures on their behalf. Improvement
in the FEC's regulation of PAC spending might reduce improper coordi-
nation among PACs and candidates, but would not lessen the corruptive
potential of uncoordinated spending. Increasing the level of direct contri-
butions would fail to discourage additional spending by PACs while resur-
recting the danger of corruptive contributions. A renewed attempt by Congress
to pass an appropriate statutory ceiling on independent expenditures, accom-
panied by legislative findings which justify such limits, is the greatest hope
for effective and acceptable regulation of independent PAC spending.
Those who oppose any direct restrictions on independent PAC spending
argue that its present role in campaign finance is relatively small. However,
the trend is toward an increasingly larger role for independent spending. The
absence of ceiling limits on PAC spending and the soaring cost of electoral
campaigns increase the potential influence of PAC money spent on a can-
didate's behalf. Rather than waiting until problems of undue influence
escalate, a national discussion on the problem and the solution of independent
spending should begin now. Debate on the merits of a $75,000 annual limit
on independent expenditures is a good starting point for that discussion.
Michael O'Neil
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